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JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 2.0 
Tamar R. Birckhead 
ABSTRACT 
     Before the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the United States Supreme Court’s exercise of 
judicial review did not support the notion that 
constitutional litigation could be an effective instrument 
of social reform. The Court’s principled rejection of 
racially segregated public education, however, gave new 
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review, transforming 
it from an obstacle into a principal means of achieving 
social progress. Since then, federal courts have impacted 
public policy in many areas—from housing, welfare, and 
transportation, to mental health institutions, prisons, and 
juvenile courts. Yet, there are inherent structural 
challenges to effecting institutional change through 
litigation: courts are themselves passive institutions that 
respond slowly to new information; they are oriented 
toward past events and circumstances rather than the 
possibilities implicit in future ones; and they graft 
qualifications onto preexisting law rather than engaging 
in a fresh consideration of the issues. In his major work, 
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The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change?, Professor Gerald Rosenberg persuasively 
argued that in order to overcome these constraints in a 
particular case or controversy, certain key elements must 
be present: incentives for the institution to change; costs 
to the institution for not changing; the existence of 
parallel institutions to help implement the change; and 
the use of court orders to leverage additional resources 
to bring about the change or to serve as a cover for 
administrators who are willing to act but fear political 
repercussions. 
     For more than sixty years after the founding of the 
first juvenile court in 1899, its philosophy and guiding 
principle were based on the rehabilitative ideal. This 
model rejected the traditional adversary system found in 
criminal court proceedings in favor of informal 
procedures, indeterminate sanctions, judicial discretion, 
and individualization. The 1967 Supreme Court case of In 
re Gault struck at the core assumptions of this paradigm 
with its emphasis on the functional similarity between 
juvenile and adult criminal courts and extension of key 
due process protections to youth charged in delinquency 
court, including the right to counsel and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. As revolutionary as the Gault 
decision was, however, its holding failed to translate into 
long-term sustainable reform—the result, at least in part, 
of the absence of the requisite factors articulated by 
Professor Rosenberg. Whether the recent Supreme Court 
cases of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. 
v. North Carolina and their progeny will facilitate such 
reform remains an open question.  
     This Article, written for a symposium at Brooklyn 
Law School, Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving 
Legal Status, explores the potential for twenty-first 
century Supreme Court decisions implicating juveniles’ 
constitutional rights to transform the way in which the 
courts process and punish young offenders. It discusses 
the method and means by which institutional reform 
litigation brings about change and the structural 
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challenges that arise when courts attempt to transform 
complex institutions. It provides a brief review of 
Supreme Court decisions prior to Brown that served to 
prevent rather than enable social change in the areas of 
slavery, racial segregation, and workers’ rights; it 
contrasts these cases with the decision and impact of 
Brown. It argues that although In re Gault was a 
foundational legal holding, it did not translate into 
effective policy due in part to local officials’ failure to 
implement the decision as expected and lawmakers’ 
inability to enact legislation that was true to the spirit of 
Gault. The Article argues that based on the analysis 
developed by Professor Rosenberg, recent Supreme Court 
decisions ending the juvenile death penalty and juvenile 
life without parole (JLWOP) sentences for non-homicides, 
and holding that a child’s age properly informs the 
Miranda custody analysis, could lead to significant 
change in both the juvenile and criminal justice systems 
for young offenders. It acknowledges the limitations of 
this theory and the challenges that are likely to arise, and 
concludes that, although courts can reform complex 
institutions, constitutional litigation is an unreliable path 
to social change.  
  
18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................... 19 
II. WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION? .... 21 
A. A Systemic Approach ...................................... 23 
1. Inherent Challenges .................................... 25 
2. Necessary Factors ...................................... 28 
B. The Role of the Supreme Court .......................... 30 
1. Judicial Review Pre-1950s ............................ 31 
2. Brown v. Board of Education ........................ 32 
3. Federal Courts Post-Brown ........................... 35 
III. WHY GAULT FAILED ........................................... 36 
A. Juvenile Justice Policy Pre-Gault ........................ 37 
B. The Impact of Gault ........................................ 39 
C. What Factors Were Missing? ............................. 41 
D. Juvenile Court Forty Years Later ........................ 43 
IV. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JUVENILE JUSTICE 
LITIGATION .................................................... 45 
A. Eighth Amendment ......................................... 47 
B. Fifth Amendment ............................................ 48 
C. Looking Ahead .............................................. 49 
V. LIMITATIONS & CHALLENGES ............................. 51 
A. Back Steps & Caveats ...................................... 52 
B. Will History Repeat Itself? ................................ 54 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................... 61 
 
  
 Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0 19 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the perspective of many juvenile justice advocates, the 
Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons1 was a long time 
coming. Simmons, which held in 2005 that imposing the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment,2 
was the first Supreme Court decision in decades to acknowledge 
the significance of the differences between minors and adults in 
the context of criminal justice.3 Five years later, Graham v. 
Florida,4 which held that life without parole sentences for non-
homicides were unconstitutional for juveniles,5 provided 
advocates with further reason to hope for an overhaul of the way 
in which the criminal and juvenile courts process and punish 
young offenders.6 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided by the 
Court in 2011,7 was perceived as extending this trajectory with 
its holding that courts must consider the youth of the suspect 
when determining whether questioning had been custodial and, 
therefore, that Miranda warnings should have been given.8   
                                                          
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2 Id. at 575. 
3 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Youth Law, Victory for 
N.Y.C.L. and Other Youth Advocates on Juvenile Death Penalty Ban (Mar. 
2, 2005), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/press_room/press_releases/ 
2005/juv_deathpenalty_ban/ (“The Court’s decision is a much-needed 
reminder that children are different from adults in terms of judgment and 
maturity, and are, therefore, less culpable . . . . [and w]e need a juvenile 
justice system that reflects those differences.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
4 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
5 Id. at 2034.  
6 See, e.g., Decision Called a “Significant Victory for Children,” EQUAL 
JUST. INITIATIVE (May 17, 2010), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/393 (“It’s an 
important win not only for kids who have been condemned to die in prison 
but for all children who need additional protection and recognition in the 
criminal justice system.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).  
8 Id. at 2406; John Kelly, Supreme Court Gives Juveniles Protection in 
Police Interrogations, YOUTH TODAY (June 16, 2011), http://www.youth 
today.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4846 (“The case, J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina[,] is the latest in a string of cases in which the high court has 
applied protection to certain groups of juveniles.”). 
20 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Each of these decisions has been hailed as “landmark,”9 and 
together they have raised expectations among scholars, 
advocates, and practitioners that a new era of reform may be 
emerging for young offenders.10 In fact, such enthusiasm over a 
Supreme Court opinion on the rights of juveniles has not been 
expressed since In re Gault,11 the 1967 case establishing that 
youth in delinquency court have basic due process rights, 
including the Sixth Amendment rights of notice, counsel, and 
confrontation, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.12 An unanswered question is whether these 
twenty-first century litigation victories will fundamentally alter 
the nature of juvenile justice policy or ultimately fail to bring 
about sustainable reform, a charge that has been leveled at the 
Gault decision itself.13   
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Scott Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP): An 
Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Rachet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 408, 410 (2011) (referencing Graham); see also Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (describing Simmons); 
Press Release, Juvenile Law Ctr., Landmark U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
Protects Miranda Rights for Youth (June 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.jlc.org/images/uploads/Press_Release_JDB_ 
Supreme_Court_Decision.pdf (referencing J.D.B.). 
10 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 8 (“[J.D.B.] represents the court’s settled 
commitment to its view that kids are different . . . . It’s just a further shoring 
up of that direction they’ve been moving in for [the] last several years.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
11 Sidney E. Zion, Court Ruling on Juveniles Is Hailed as Ending Unfair 
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1967, at A31 (“What this case means in its 
most dramatic terms is that for 68 years we’ve been putting youngsters into 
juvenile institutions by procedures which we now learn have been 
unconstitutional . . . .”); see also Fred P. Graham, High Court Rules Adult 
Code Holds in Juvenile Trials, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1967, at A1 (“The 
landmark [Gault] decision is expected to require that radical changes be made 
immediately in most of the nation’s 3,000 juvenile courts.”). 
12 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 56–57 (1967). 
13 See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 39, 41–43 (2003) (“In failing to consider what procedural 
adaptations were demanded by the special context of juvenile court, Gault 
reduced the analysis of children’s due process rights to the simple-minded 
question of adult rights or no rights. And in the many cases considering 
accused juveniles’ due process rights since Gault, the Court has adhered to 
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This Article, written for a symposium at Brooklyn Law 
School on “Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving Legal 
Status,” explores the contours and nuances of this question. Part 
II discusses the method and means by which institutional reform 
litigation is designed to bring about change and the structural 
challenges that arise when courts attempt to transform complex 
institutions. It provides a brief review of late nineteenth century 
Supreme Court decisions that served to prevent rather than 
enable social change in the areas of slavery, racial segregation, 
and workers’ rights. Part II then contrasts these cases with the 
decision and impact of Brown v. Board of Education, in which 
the Court rejected racially segregated public schools, giving new 
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review.14 Part III argues 
that, although Gault was a foundational legal holding, it did not 
translate into effective policy due in part to the failures of local 
officials to implement the decision as intended and lawmakers to 
enact legislation that was true to its spirit. Part IV argues that, 
based on the analysis established by Gerald Rosenberg,15 
Simmons and its progeny have the potential to catalyze 
significant change for young offenders in both the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems. Part V acknowledges the limitations to 
this theory and the challenges that are likely to arise and 
concludes that although courts can reform complex institutions, 
constitutional litigation is an “unreliable path to social change.”16   
II. WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION? 
Using the frame of “institutional reform litigation”17 to 
                                                          
this narrow and nonsensical framing.”). 
14 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 
349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
15 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 32–36 (2d ed. 2008); see also CHRISTOPHER P. 
MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 10 (1998) (stating that 
courts can become generators of social reform when certain conditions are met). 
16 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 10. 
17 This type of litigation is also frequently referred to by other terms, 
such as “structural reform litigation,” “constitutional reform litigation,” 
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examine whether Supreme Court decisions can bring about long-
term, sustainable reform of the juvenile courts may not be a 
perfect fit.18 Although juvenile courts may be broadly defined as 
“institutions,” they are not institutions in quite the same sense as 
the entities and public organizations considered the traditional 
objects of this type of litigation—school districts, state prisons, 
and mental health hospitals.19 Nonetheless, given the emphasis 
advocates and interest groups since In re Gault have placed on 
using constitutional litigation to bring about change in the 
juvenile courts, and the failure of both lawmakers and 
bureaucrats to alter the fundamental nature of the system, it is 
conceptually useful to analyze the strategy through this lens. 
Further, it may be argued that the project of court-ordered reform 
of a legal system is ideally positioned for success, as judges 
presumably have a level of expertise in this area that they lack in 
other settings.20 It may also be said, however, that appellate court 
judges—particularly members of the Supreme Court—have limited 
appreciation for the day-to-day functioning of the juvenile court 
system21 or understanding of children and adolescents.22 
                                                          
“impact litigation,” “cause litigation,” and “public law litigation.” 
18 See Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice, by 
Christopher P. Manfredi, 8 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 32, 33–34 (1998) (book 
review), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews 
/manfredi.htm; see also Emily N. Winfield, Judicial Policymaking and 
Juvenile Detention Reform: A Case Study of Jimmy Doe et al. v. Cook 
County, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 225, 238–39 (2008) (“Courts are rarely 
equipped to engage in the sort of long-term monitoring required to bring 
about systemic reform.”). 
19 Wasby, supra note 18, at 33. 
20 See MANFREDI, supra note 15, at xi; see also DONALD T. KRAMER, 
Post-Gault Reforms and Trends: The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 21:5 (2d ed. 2010) (stating 
that juvenile justice litigation is “proving to be a most effective means of 
advocacy as well as a catalyst for legislative reform and citizen 
mobilization”). 
21 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 550–51 
(1971) (holding that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, 
that juvenile court judges can be as objective fact-finders as jurors, and that 
“[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be 
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its 
separate existence”). 
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This Part begins the analysis by setting out the nature and 
process of constitutional reform litigation, the inherent 
challenges faced by courts that assume this role, and the key 
factors needed in a case or controversy to overcome these 
constraints. It then briefly examines the shift in the Supreme 
Court’s exercise of judicial review after Brown v. Board of 
Education, transforming the concept from a major obstacle to 
social progress to a “principal means” of achieving it, and 
catalyzing a trend that included reform of the juvenile courts.23 
A. A Systemic Approach 
The general objective of institutional reform litigation is to 
“modify the framework of procedural and substantive rules 
according to which social and political institutions operate.”24 
Through the process of judicial review, courts utilize primary 
rights—such as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses—to 
“acquire and mobilize” secondary rights—such as the right to 
racially integrated school districts or the right to representation 
by counsel at juvenile delinquency hearings.25 They invoke these 
rights to impact the way in which an institution functions, 
generating remedial decrees or policy directives from the court 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2416 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]urther problems are likely to emerge as judges 
attempt to put themselves in the shoes of the average 16-year-old. . . . Forty-
five years of personal experience and societal change separate this judge from 
the days when he or she was 15 years old. And this judge may or may not 
have been an average 15-year-old.”). 
23 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 1. 
24 Id. at 2. 
25 Id. at 2–3. See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG 
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18–42, 111–57 (2008) (comparing “strong” judicial 
review, in which judicial interpretations of the constitution prevail over 
legislative interpretations, with “weak” judicial review, which enables 
legislative interpretations of the constitution to operate alongside judicial 
interpretations, and arguing that weak review may lessen the strain that 
strong review places on the democratic principle of majority rule).  
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to the institution as the principal means of effecting change.26 In 
this way, courts address an issue by adopting an aggressive role 
as enforcers of the constitutional rights of individuals.27 They 
order the expenditure of funds necessary to protect the right at 
stake and create oversight mechanisms to ensure the continued 
implementation of their remedies.28  
Much has been written regarding the phases of institutional 
reform litigation, with Phillip Cooper’s scholarship being among 
the most consistently cited.29 Cooper describes the process as 
occurring in four basic stages: the “triggering” event, policy or 
practice; the finding of liability during the litigation; the 
development of a remedy, in which the judge serves the roles of 
facilitator, negotiator, and ultimate ratifier of the remedial 
decree; and the post-decree phase when the parties may return to 
the judge to request changes in the implementation process.30 
Cooper’s extensive research reveals that the majority of remedial 
decree cases are not planned but reactive—and thus 
unpredictable—in nature, triggered by anything from a riot to a 
frustrated tenant to a lawyer determined to right a wrong that 
she read about online.31 Once the matter finds its way into court, 
the case is likely to expand from a single issue into a set of 
issues that had been “lying out there waiting for a trigger.”32 
The development of the litigation phase is determined largely by 
the skill of the lawyer involved, whose ability to establish an 
                                                          
26 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 2–3.  
27 Id. at 2. But see E-mail from Kathryn Sabbeth, Assistant Professor of 
Law, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill Sch. of Law, to author (June 26, 2011) 
(on file with author) (suggesting that the attorney representing the plaintiff, as 
the private attorney general, is the enforcer of the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights in a greater sense than the court). 
28 See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 
6–7 (1977). 
29 See, e.g., ROBERT COLDWELL WOOD & CLEMENT E. VOSE, REMEDIAL 
LAW: WHEN COURTS BECOME ADMINISTRATORS 32 (1990); Susan Poser, 
What’s a Judge to Do? Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307, 1310–11, 1314, 1325 (2004). 
30 PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 16–24, 328–50 (1988). 
31 WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 32. 
32 Id. at 33. 
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adequate record affects the availability of potential remedies.33 
The lawyer must make strategic decisions when defining the 
issues to be presented, taking into consideration such factors as 
convenience and litigation costs. Lawyers for public interest 
organizations with affiliated membership groups may be 
influenced by the pre-established priorities of their members and 
the lawyers’ understanding of how best to prioritize the 
divergent interests of a loosely-defined population whose 
interests they must represent.34 Cooper has identified three 
approaches to the post-decree or implementation phase that are 
based on the degree to which a judge “trusts” and is willing to 
defer to a target agency: a judge may directly oversee 
compliance, leaving the details of the way in which goals are 
met to the organization itself; parties may enter into a consent 
decree or mutually agreeable, legally binding plan or process; or 
a judge may place the agency in receivership, substituting its 
administration for the current one.35 Given the number of 
variables necessary to generate litigation that results in a remedy 
with which the target institution complies, it is hardly surprising 
when courts fall short of achieving their goals. 
1. Inherent Challenges 
The social science literature on institutional reform litigation 
is dominated by work that emphasizes the inability of courts to 
bring about meaningful social change, with perhaps the most 
influential studies conducted by Gerald Rosenberg36 and Donald 
Horowitz.37 These scholars and others have described the 
multiple ways in which courts are structurally ill-suited for the 
project. The “bounded nature of constitutional rights” prevents 
                                                          
33 COOPER, supra note 30, at 343; WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 33. 
34 See Sabbeth, supra note 27, at 1; see also RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE 
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 13 (2007) (“My goal . . . is to highlight the 
consequences of [civil rights] lawyers’ strategic litigation choices about which 
cases to pursue and which to avoid, which harms to emphasize and which to 
ignore, [and] which constituencies to address and which to disregard.”). 
35 WOOD & VOSE, supra note 29, at 36–37. 
36 See ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 35. 
37 See HOROWITZ, supra note 28. 
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courts from hearing many types of claims; precedent and culture 
prevent judges from recognizing new rights; and courts often 
decide issues on technical bases, lessening the “chances of 
popular mobilization.”38 Scholars have also highlighted the fact 
that courts are passive institutions that must wait for others to 
bring claims and raise issues. The resulting pool of available 
cases may not accurately reflect or represent the general impact 
of the policies under review.39 Further, unlike legislatures, 
courts typically focus on past events, speaking the language of 
“rights” and “remedies,” rather than on the future impact of 
their decisions or the costs and benefits of taking different 
courses of action.40 Courts are thereby forced to graft 
qualifications onto new decisions rather than to consider issues 
de novo. A narrow focus on the anomalies of individual cases 
makes it difficult, at best, to fashion systemic remedies.41 With 
the current economic downturn, conditions have become even 
more challenging, as U.S. courts grapple with budget crises that 
can either limit or completely quash proposals for reform.42  
In recent years, major constitutional law scholars such as 
Ran Hirschl and Mark Tushnet have enriched this classic 
literature with comparative work on the politics of 
constitutionalism and judicial review and the allocation of social 
and economic rights. For instance, through in-depth case studies 
on constitutional reforms in Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and 
South Africa, Hirschl has demonstrated that elected officials 
initiate legal reform and delegate political power to the courts 
not to protect minority groups from the tyranny of majority rule, 
but as a means of preserving their own interests.43 Meanwhile, 
Tushnet has addressed the conventional view that social welfare 
                                                          
38 ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 10–13. 
39 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 9–10; see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1978). 
40 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 9. 
41 HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 35–38. 
42 See, e.g., Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent 
Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2005) (discussing the need for 
legislative funding as a means of reinforcing judicial legitimacy). 
43 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 149–210 (2004). 
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rights do not belong in constitutions because courts cannot 
enforce them.44 Using empirical studies of courts in Ireland, 
South Africa, and the United States, he challenged the 
assumption that judicial enforcement of social and economic 
rights must take the form of coercive orders to the political 
branches by suggesting that courts exercise weaker forms of 
remedies to enforce these rights.45   
Not all scholars share Horowitz’s approach to the question of 
whether courts are equipped or designed to bring about social 
change. Some have challenged the seemingly single-minded 
focus on the shortcomings of judges and courts during the 
adjudicative process, asserting that the decision-making 
processes of legislators and administrators can be equally 
ineffectual.46 Others have suggested that court-based systemic 
reform can divert activists from pursuing the avenues of 
legislative and political reform, which historically have been 
more successful than judicial rulemaking in effecting change.47 
Conservative scholars have characterized judicial oversight of 
schools, prisons, and other state institutions as “intervention 
[that] conflicts with democratic principles,” asserting, inter alia, 
that it grounds social policy on “atypical situations and the ever-
shifting judgments of experts.”48 Such critics have contended that 
Congress should “narrow the concept of standing, the 
availability of class actions, and provisions for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.”49 In contrast, progressive scholars have 
warned that because the legal system favors those of means and 
because courts are either unwilling or unable to address 
fundamental economic and social inequality, the remedies 
                                                          
44 TUSHNET, supra note 25, at 196–264. 
45 Id. at 228. 
46 See, e.g., Wasby, supra note 18, at 35. 
47 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS 185–94 (1999). 
48 Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Political World of Federal Judges as 
Managers, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 660, 660 (1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
49 Id. (citing Gary L. McDowell, A Modest Remedy for Judicial 
Activism, PUB. INT., Spring 1982, at 3). 
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imposed through litigation are likely to be modest.50 This point is 
likely to be particularly salient in the context of constitutional—
as opposed to statutory—litigation, in which the poor have not 
been recognized as a protected class, and the Constitution has 
not been found to support a right to equal access to social 
resources.51 Similarly, it has been observed that impact litigation 
“unleashes legal, political, and social forces over which the 
initiators of institutional reform litigation have little control,” 
highlighting the difficulty of managing the direction and speed of 
systemic reform.52  
While the assertion that there is no silver bullet for policy 
reform is undoubtedly true, there is value in closely examining 
the efficacy of litigation, as it has been one of the principle 
means of bringing about change in the United States since the 
mid-twentieth century.53 Given the ongoing focus of liberal 
reformers on impact litigation (and its increasing use by 
conservatives as well),54 it is critical that scholars continue to 
analyze why certain structural reform cases succeed while others 
do not. 
2. Necessary Factors 
With his 1991 work (and its 2008 second edition), The 
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, Gerald 
Rosenberg persuasively argued that in order for courts to 
                                                          
50 See, e.g., SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL 
SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 148–59 (1990); 
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 150 (1974); Wendy 
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 175 (1982). 
51 See Sabbeth, supra note 27, at 1. 
52 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 199. 
53 ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 430. 
54 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 15–16, 148–53 
(1985); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING 
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 8–40 (2008) (tracing how conservative and 
libertarian lawyers have created dozens of public interest organizations 
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overcome structural constraints, certain key elements must be 
present in a particular case or controversy: incentives for the 
institution to change; costs to the institution for not changing; 
the existence of parallel institutions to help implement the 
change; and the use of court orders to leverage additional 
resources to effectuate change or to serve as a cover for 
administrators who are willing to act but fear political 
repercussions.55 
Although each case presents its own specific circumstances 
and hurdles, the terms used share certain commonalities. 
“Incentives” typically refer to rewards for successful 
implementation of reform proposals, which most often take the 
form of federal funding or other monetary benefits.56 “Costs” 
generally mean the loss of money, either public or private, 
resulting from legislative or administrative action taken when the 
key actors fail to implement a particular decision.57 When 
individuals or groups are willing and able to create their own 
institutions, rather than relying on existing ones to act, courts 
can bring about social change through markets—although this 
avenue is only possible when a realistic market alternative exists 
and when courts allow market forces to act.58 The use of court 
orders and consent decrees can be effective for securing 
increased funding from the legislature; they can also be used to 
gain the cooperation of staff members, community members, 
and politicians who are otherwise resistant to reform.59 Thus, 
Rosenberg’s model calls for the presence of sufficient precedent; 
executive and legislative support; low-level public support or 
limited public opposition; and either positive incentives to induce 
compliance, costs to induce compliance, the possibility of 
market implementation, or key administrators who desire change 
or for whom the court provides leverage or cover.60  
Although Rosenberg’s analysis has not been without its 
                                                          
55 ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 32–36. 
56 Id. at 32–33. 
57 Id. at 33. 
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59 Id. at 33–34. 
60 Id. at 30–36. 
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detractors,61 his framework setting out the factors necessary for 
successful court-driven reform and his ultimate conclusion that 
American courts are relatively weak and ineffectual have 
become a touchstone for subsequent scholarship in this area.62   
B. The Role of the Supreme Court 
During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued 
a series of decisions that served to prevent rather than enable 
social change in such areas as slavery, racial segregation, and 
workers’ rights. By the 1930s, the NAACP had organized a 
broad program of legal attacks on racial segregation aimed at the 
“most blatant inequalities in school facilities and teacher 
salaries.”63 During the 1940s and early 1950s, Department of 
Justice lawyers in the Civil Rights Division addressed the labor-
based and economic harms of the Jim Crow system.64 With its 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court dramatically 
shifted the paradigm. Civil rights doctrine post-Brown has 
primarily addressed policies of classification based on personal 
characteristics, such as race, gender, and national origin, and 
the “stigmatic harm” of such governmental classifications.65 This 
Section contrasts the Supreme Court cases that preceded Brown 
with the federal circuit court cases that followed it, suggesting 
                                                          
61 See, e.g., David Schultz & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism 
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that Brown served as a “crystallizing moment that channeled 
legal energy toward some kinds of cases and legal theories 
rather than others.”66  
1. Judicial Review Pre-1950s 
Prior to the 1950s, the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial 
review did not support the notion that constitutional litigation 
could be an effective instrument of progressive social reform.67 
There are numerous examples of late nineteenth- and early-
twentieth century cases that substantiate this view, with perhaps 
the most notable being major decisions in the areas of slavery, 
civil rights, economic regulation, and child labor.68 During this 
period, the Court upheld the right to make and enforce 
contracts, the right to property, and the right to liberty afforded 
to employers and employees. For instance, in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, the Court allowed slavery to expand into the federal 
territories when it held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause protected the property rights of slave owners.69 In the 
1883 Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause protected against racial 
discrimination committed only by governments, not by private 
individuals and organizations.70 In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court 
upheld state-mandated racial segregation on intrastate railroads.71 
In Lochner v. New York, the Court invalidated a New York 
statute forbidding bakers from working more than sixty hours 
per week.72 In both 1918 and 1935, the Court declared 
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congressional attempts to regulate exploitative child labor 
practices unconstitutional.73 As a result of such opinions, 
constitutional litigation became a principle means of maintaining 
the status quo.74   
Several studies on the role of the judicial branch during this 
period further illustrate its expanding scope and impact.75 Arnold 
Paul has found that because post-Civil War era social protests 
were perceived as placing property interests at risk, arguably 
necessitating judicial involvement, the courts assumed increased 
importance.76 By the mid-1890s, the judiciary “emerged . . . as 
the principal bulwark of conservative defense,” with the 
Supreme Court consistently striking down legislative attempts at 
economic regulation.77 Meanwhile, legal progressives who 
supported such regulation were critical of the Court, asserting 
that it was antidemocratic and acting against the people’s will.78 
As the work of Paul and other scholars demonstrates, the 
relationship among the legal doctrines, court decisions, and 
attitudes of lawyers and judges of that era shifted as social 
tensions grew and evolved.   
2. Brown v. Board of Education 
With Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of racial segregation in public education gave new 
legitimacy to the concept of judicial review, transforming it 
from an obstacle into a principal means of achieving social 
progress.79 Holding that the policy of “separate but equal” 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, “Brown overturned nearly 
                                                          
73 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 524, 550–51 
(1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). 
74 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 1. 
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76 Id. at 2. 
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78 Id. at 39–60. 
79 MANFREDI, supra note 15, at 1. See generally Robert M. Cover, The 
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sixty years of Court-sanctioned segregation.”80 The decision has 
been said to have “buried Jim Crow,”81 and to have “served as 
the . . . ideological engine” of the civil rights movement.82 For 
nearly six decades it has been considered the “principal 
inspiration to others who seek change through litigation”83 and 
the “symbol” of the Court’s ability to generate social change.84  
There are, however, critics of this view. Michael Klarman, for 
instance, has asserted “that Brown was directly responsible for only 
the most token forms of southern public school desegregation.”85 
Relying on a variety of secondary sources, Klarman established 
that nearly a decade after Brown, the number of children attending 
desegregated schools had not measurably increased.86 He illustrated 
further that it was only after the 1964 Civil Rights Act threatened 
to cut federal funding to southern school districts that the numbers 
began to shift.87 As a result, Brown did not bring about change by 
stirring northern whites into action or by raising the expectations of 
southern blacks, but did so indirectly by spurring white 
segregationists to suppress civil rights demonstrations violently, 
which in turn led to national demands for civil rights legislation.88 
Michael Seidman has argued that Brown merely reinforced the 
fiction that desegregation brought an end to all racial barriers, 
enabling white society to blame blacks for their continued poverty 
and disempowerment, a status that “was now no longer a result of 
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the denial of equality . . . . [but] marked a personal failure to take 
advantage of one’s definitionally equal status.”89 Observing that the 
quality of public education for many minority children has 
decreased and that levels of racial segregation in city schools 
remain high decades after Brown,90 Derrick Bell has suggested that 
the civil rights lawyers who litigated Brown were more committed 
to their belief in racial integration than to the educational interests 
of their clients.91 In writing that Brown failed to “reform[] the 
ideology of racial domination that Plessy v. Ferguson 
represented,”92 Bell has provocatively argued that if the Court in 
Brown had upheld the doctrine of “separate but equal,” the civil 
rights loss may have ultimately opened up “opportunities for 
effective schooling capable of turning constitutional defeat into a 
major educational victory.”93 Meanwhile, Cooper and other 
scholars have observed that while Brown was a legal success, it 
was neither a typical nor an ideal impact litigation case. Instead, it 
resulted from “careful planning, control, and coordination” by 
well-established civil rights lawyers who utilized a precise and 
coherent strategy, factors not often present in these types of cases.94  
                                                          
89 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 
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Regardless of the exact chain of causation linking Brown to 
the end of segregation, the decision continues to represent an 
instance in which a court acting in tandem with the legislative 
and executive branches produced significant social 
reformindirectly if not directly.  
3. Federal Courts Post-Brown 
In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, federal courts 
took steps to reform public policy in a variety of areas. For 
instance, mandatory bus transportation was ordered to 
implement desegregation in North Carolina public schools.95 
Likewise, providing inadequate medical treatment to patients 
confined at state mental hospitals in Alabama was found to be 
unconstitutional.96 Yet, litigation victories for plaintiffs have 
been consistently followed by push-back from other 
constituencies. One example is prison reform, which is premised 
on the claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Following 
several successful litigation campaigns in this area,97 Congress 
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),98 which placed 
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rigorous procedural requirements on judicial orders and 
mandated that remedies be directed only at constitutional 
violations.99 Although Congress adopted a statute allowing 
prevailing parties in federal court to collect attorneys’ fees in 
constitutional challenges to the actions of government officials,100 
the statute had “some downsides,” including the diversion of 
resources from precedential but risky cases to those in which 
success was more likely and could, therefore, cover the 
expenses of litigation.101 The PLRA further limited attorneys’ 
fees by significantly lowering the reimbursement rate to that 
earned by lawyers appointed to represent federal indigent 
defendants.102 Despite the adverse reactions to Brown, however, 
the decision did catalyze numerous organizations and individuals 
to bring types of actions that had rarely been pursued before.103 
Reform of the juvenile courts was an important part of this post-
Brown trend, with In re Gault having the broadest impact. 
III. WHY GAULT FAILED 
In 2007, juvenile justice advocates, scholars, and 
practitioners celebrated the fortieth anniversary of In re Gault.104 
The decision was lauded as having ushered in the modern 
juvenile court, one in which youth receive many of the same due 
process rights as adult criminal defendants, including the right to 
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.105 Yet, it has 
also been acknowledged that the victory was bittersweet, for in 
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many of today’s juvenile courtrooms, youth regularly waive 
their right to legal counsel, are adjudicated delinquent despite a 
lack of sufficient evidence, and are sentenced to serve terms in 
facilities that are little more than warehouses for our 
communities’ poor children of color.106 The examination of why 
Gault failed, therefore, is a vitally important one, particularly in 
light of recent Supreme Court cases brought on behalf of 
juveniles.  
A. Juvenile Justice Policy Pre-Gault 
Before 1899, criminal suspects and offenders under the age 
of eighteen were treated no differently than their adult 
counterparts and were subject to the same procedures and 
penalties, resulting in high rates of recidivism.107 In Chicago, for 
instance, children as young as seven were arrested for petty theft 
and detained with adult offenders until the next court session, 
prompting the Chicago Herald to report, “[t]here are no 
healthful influences brought to bear on these youthful offenders, 
neither physically nor morally . . . . It is not a house of 
correction with them—it is a house of perversion, corruption and 
retrogression for them.”108 The 1893 article concluded by 
asserting that “these boys were really more sinned against than 
sinning,” echoing the views of lawyers and judges who held the 
city itself responsible for a justice system that “manufactured 
criminals.”109   
The juvenile court movement developed in reaction to the 
punitive treatment of young offenders by the criminal courts as 
well as the perception that the family unit had failed to supervise 
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its children.110 Greater numbers of women were working outside 
the home during the Progressive Period of the late nineteenth 
century and forced to balance the competing obligations of 
employment and child supervision.111 While institutional care for 
poor families in alms houses and asylums had been a popular 
policy, “the public became increasingly unwilling to mix 
children with other paupers and demanded the creation of 
separate orphanages for children.”112 The juvenile court emerged 
during this period, which was characterized by anxiety over the 
“social decline” of urban life, optimism that solutions could be 
found by skilled professionals, and a strong belief that criminal 
behavior was caused by the failure of nurture, not nature.113 
Reformers focused on environmental causes of delinquency, 
asserting that children must be properly socialized against 
corruption; they deemphasized the importance of specific 
misconduct in favor of evaluating the whole child,114 an example 
of “substantive” rather than “legal” justice.115 The belief that the 
juvenile court must serve as a substitute for parents when they 
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neglect to follow through on their responsibilities formed the 
basis for the doctrine of parens patriae.116  
During the first fifty years of the juvenile court’s 
development, it had broad jurisdiction over all types of conduct 
by and circumstances affecting children. State juvenile codes 
contained expansive definitions of “neglect” and “delinquent” 
and utilized catch-all phrases such as “incorrigible” and 
“growing up in idleness or crime” to reach any disfavored 
behavior that suggested parental failure.117 The court was run 
informally and few procedural protections were afforded to 
juveniles. The judge typically focused on reforming the child 
rather than deterrence or retribution and on determining the 
“truth” of what happened rather than strict adherence to the 
rules of evidence.118 This approach often resulted in 
indeterminate probationary or incarcerative dispositions that 
relied on a judge’s subjective assessment of a child’s needs, 
rather than the nature and seriousness of the offense 
committed.119 It is not surprising, therefore, that this model led 
to circumstances such as those faced by fifteen-year-old Gerald 
Gault when he appeared in the Gila County juvenile court in 
Arizona in 1964.   
B. The Impact of Gault 
In re Gault was the second in a trio of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court between 1966 and 1970 that addressed the due 
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process rights of juveniles. Gault was preceded by Kent v. 
United States, which held that a juvenile cannot be transferred 
from delinquency to adult criminal court without a “fair 
hearing” in which the youth is represented by counsel who has 
access to the client’s probation records.120 It was followed by In 
re Winship, which held that the standard of proof in juvenile 
court must be the same as that in adult criminal court—beyond a 
reasonable doubt—and not the lesser preponderance of the 
evidence standard.121 Together these cases reflected the view that 
the system’s purpose is to assess whether a young person 
committed a criminal offense, and that juvenile courts should be 
concerned with what a child does, rather than who a child is.122  
The facts of Gault provided an ideal forum for the Court to 
review the progress and impact of juvenile court during its first 
half century. Gerald Gault, who had previously been on 
probation for being with a boy who stole a wallet, was 
sentenced to up to six years in juvenile prison for making a 
“lewd or indecent” phone call to a female neighbor, for which 
the maximum penalty for an adult was only two months or a 
fifty dollar fine.123 Gault’s parents had not been given meaningful 
notice of the charges; he had no lawyer at the hearing; and he 
was not advised of his right to remain silent.124 No record was 
made; no witnesses were sworn; and no appeal was possible.125 
Gault’s holding that basic due process rights apply to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings—including the right to counsel, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and the opportunity for 
cross-examination of witnesses—struck at the core assumptions 
of a paradigm that had guided juvenile justice reform for 
decades.126 By recognizing that “[u]nbridled discretion . . . is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,” the 
Court ruled that practices that had long been accepted and even 
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encouraged under traditional juvenile court theory were 
unconstitutional.127  
Gault, however, was not a complete rejection of the juvenile 
court model or of non-punitive responses to adolescent 
misconduct. The Court’s decision acknowledged that there were 
“substantive benefits” to the system that basic due process 
protections would not “abandon or displace.”128 Finding that the 
system had failed to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders 
effectively, the Court noted its regret that the juvenile court had 
been unable to achieve its goals, but expressed confidence that 
“the features of the juvenile system[,] which its proponents have 
asserted are of unique benefit[,] will not be impaired by 
constitutional domestication.”129   
C. What Factors Were Missing? 
Despite the Court’s assurance that the positive aspects of the 
traditional juvenile court would not be lost with adherence to 
due process standards, developments in juvenile justice policy 
after Gault were the opposite of what the Court had predicted.130 
In perhaps the largest study completed in the years immediately 
following the decision, it was found that “failure to comply with 
Gault’s rules was widespread,” resulting in “sometimes flagrant 
disregard of constitutional rights.”131 Many juvenile court judges 
believed that they were not bound by the requirements of Gault 
as long as the adjudication of delinquency did not result in 
incarceration of the child; others were unfamiliar with the 
specifics of the decision.132 Local officials resisted implementing 
rules of the Supreme Court, which they perceived as having 
little enforcement power over them.133 States passed legislation 
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that was designed to make the juvenile court system look more 
like the adult criminal court system, but much was lost in the 
translation.134 A “quid pro quo” attitude took effect in which 
courts denied specific procedural protections to young offenders 
out of a belief that juvenile court was rehabilitative rather than 
punitive.135 Alternatively, some courts asserted that if too many 
procedural rights were extended to juveniles, the “intimate, 
informal, [and] protective” nature of delinquency court would be 
lost.136   
Applying the analytic framework developed by Rosenberg to 
Gault, it is clear that very few of the key elements needed for 
successful institutional reform litigation were present. There 
were no incentives from outside actors that served to catalyze 
change within the juvenile court. Equally important, there were 
few incentives for the main participants within the system to 
change, as most were invested in maintaining the informal 
culture of the court. Juvenile defense attorneys, for instance, 
lacked the inclination and commitment to assume a truly 
adversarial role on behalf of young offenders and instead acted 
as mediators.137 Judges were committed to the rehabilitative ideal 
and were protective of their broad discretionary powers.138 
Likewise, there were no outside actors or parallel institutions 
imposing costs for non-compliance.139 Because hearings were 
either closed to or ignored by the public, there was little to no 
oversight of the proceedings.140 Although Gault had some effect 
on the work of state lawmakers, reform of juvenile codes 
focused mainly on the decriminalization of status offenses such 
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135 See HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 174, 177–78; Tamar R. Birckhead, 
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as incorrigibility, truancy, and running away, which formerly 
had been punished in delinquency court.141 In these ways, the 
implementation of Gault fell far short of its goals because the 
Court “lack[ed] the tools to enforce its decree.”142   
D. Juvenile Court Forty Years Later 
Studies conducted two decades after Gault by Barry Feld and 
others reported findings similar to the data collected immediately 
following the decision: juvenile courts had continued to fail to 
comply with the Court’s holding.143 During this period and well 
into the 1990s, sanctions became increasingly punitive for young 
offenders; the age cap on delinquency court jurisdiction was 
lowered in some states and never raised in others, and the 
percentage of juveniles transferred to adult criminal court 
grew.144 In fact, in many states, there was no check on 
                                                          
141 HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 207–218. 
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prosecutorial discretion regarding whom to charge, what to 
charge, and whom to transfer from juvenile to adult court.145 In 
most states, juveniles did not have the right to a jury trial, one 
of the few protections against racial bias and discrimination by 
prosecutors.146 Similarly, few states provided judicial oversight 
of discretionary decisions made by police or juvenile probation 
officers, decisions that impacted who entered the juvenile court 
system and who remained there.147 
Forty years after Gault, the juvenile justice system continues 
to provide children with “the worst of both worlds.”148 There is 
overwhelming evidence that juveniles receive substandard 
representation, according to state assessments of the quality of 
defense counsel conducted by the American Bar Association.149 
There is a mixed record on rehabilitation of young offenders, 
with empirical data showing that recidivism rates increase as a 
result of juvenile court involvement150 and that exposure to the 
juvenile justice system enhances the risk that youth will engage 
in criminal activity as adults.151 Further, “disproportionate 
minority contact,” the phenomenon in which children of color 
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(2007 Update), NCJJ SNAPSHOT (Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, 
Pa.), Feb. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/Snapshots/2008 
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enter the juvenile justice system at a higher rate than their white 
counterparts, is an entrenched problem, as confirmed by 
statistics from the United States Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention.152  
In short, the beneficial effects of Gault were temporary. The 
victory was a largely symbolic one in which change was inspired 
but not maintained.153 The case, therefore, stands as an example 
of what happens when courts serve “an ideological function of 
luring a movement for social reform to an institution that is 
structurally constrained from serving its needs, providing only 
an illusion of change.”154 Whether twenty-first century juvenile 
justice litigation will confront the same fate remains to be seen. 
IV. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JUVENILE JUSTICE 
LITIGATION 
Between 1970 and 2005, there were few Supreme Court 
decisions involving juvenile justice and even fewer that extended 
the legacy of In re Gault. In fact, nearly all of the Court’s 
opinions during this period served to curb Gault’s efforts to 
bring standard criminal court processes to juvenile court. 
Beginning in 1971, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 
that juvenile proceedings are not equivalent to criminal 
prosecutions, and that the context-driven standard of 
“fundamental fairness” does not require that an accused youth 
has a right to a jury trial.155 Four years later in Breed v. Jones, 
the Court decided that the double jeopardy clause prohibits 
juvenile courts from conducting transfer hearings after 
delinquency adjudication hearings, although in sharp contrast to 
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the cynicism expressed in Gault, Kent v. United States, and In 
re Winship, the Court took pains to portray the juvenile system 
as largely beneficial to children.156 In 1975, in Goss v. Lopez,157 
the Court held that students do not have the right to a formal 
hearing before receiving a school suspension of fewer than ten 
days. Three years later in Swisher v. Brady, the Court declined 
to strike a state statute allowing the prosecutor to file exceptions 
to a “not guilty” finding made by a master of the juvenile 
court.158 In 1979, in Fare v. Michael C., the Court refused to 
apply elements of Miranda v. Arizona to juvenile proceedings 
when it held that a sixteen-year-old’s request to speak to his 
probation officer was not the equivalent of an invocation of the 
right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney.159 Michael 
C., together with Goss and Swisher, gave new life to the 
traditional view of juvenile court that had been discredited in 
Gault.160 The 1984 case of Schall v. Martin furthered this trend 
by allowing for preventative pretrial detention of accused 
juveniles upon a finding of “serious risk” that they would 
reoffend.161 The majority opinion in Schall, written by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, is perhaps best known for justifying 
institutional restraints on minors by the fact that “juveniles, 
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”162 The 
following year, the Rehnquist Court gave states even wider 
latitude over the rights of youth when it held in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. that searches of students by school officials are not 
subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
and need only be justified by a reasonable cause standard.163  
It was not until 2005, nearly forty years after Gault, that the 
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Supreme Court introduced a major shift in the perspective of the 
legal system towards young people who commit crime. A discussion 
of whether the Court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. 
Florida, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina have the potential to transform 
the juvenile justice system on either the macro or micro level follows. 
A. Eighth Amendment 
In the two decades between T.L.O. and Simmons, the 
Supreme Court addressed the rights of youth charged with 
criminal offenses on only two occasions, both in the context of 
the Eighth Amendment.164 In 1988, the Court prohibited the 
death penalty for offenders who were fifteen and younger in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma,165 only to uphold it the following year 
for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds in Stanford v. Kentucky.166 
With its 2005 decision in Simmons, the Court held that as a 
categorical matter, juveniles are not as culpable as adults and, 
thus, are not deserving of capital punishment, overruling 
Stanford.167 Citing sociological and scientific research, the Court 
emphasized the differences between children and adults in such 
areas as impulse control, susceptibility to peer pressure, and 
character formation.168  While Simmons is clearly important from 
the perspective of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
decision also has potential ramifications for the juvenile justice 
system at large.169 The majority’s recognition that age matters 
and that it would be misguided from a “moral standpoint” to 
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equate the failings of minors with those of adults has been and 
will continue to influence other areas of doctrine and theory.170 
Five years later, the Court relied on Simmons when it held, 
in Graham v. Florida, that the Eighth Amendment does not 
permit juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes to be 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole 
(JLWOP).171 The Graham Court applied a form of Eighth 
Amendment comparative analysis that previously had been 
reserved only for capital cases, exempting an entire class of 
offenders who had committed a range of crimes from JLWOP, 
rather than balancing the gravity of the crime against the 
severity of an individual sentence, as is typically done in term-
of-years cases.172 Relying on Simmons, the Court again invoked 
social science research on adolescent behavior as well as neuro-
scientific data on brain development to support the view that 
young offenders are incomplete works in progress for whom 
redemption remains viable.173 Justice Anthony Kennedy, who 
wrote the majority opinions in both Simmons and Graham, felt 
strongly that courts must take age into account at all stages of 
the criminal justice process. This view became central to the 
court’s opinion in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, decided one year 
after Graham.174   
B. Fifth Amendment 
In 2011, the Supreme Court held that a suspect’s age must 
be a factor when determining whether police interrogation was 
custodial, thereby requiring Miranda warnings.175 The Petitioner, 
J.D.B., was a thirteen-year-old student who was questioned 
about local break-ins by a uniformed police investigator in a 
conference room at his middle school.176 The school resource 
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officer, assistant principal, and administrative intern were also 
present, although no one had attempted to reach J.D.B.’s 
grandmother who was his legal guardian.177 The assistant 
principal urged him to “do the right thing,” asserting that “the 
truth always comes out in the end.”178 Without advising him that 
he could refuse to speak with them and could have a lawyer 
appointed, the police investigator warned J.D.B. that if he kept 
breaking into houses, he could “get sent to juvenile detention 
before court.”179 The North Carolina juvenile and appellate 
courts found the boy’s youth to be irrelevant to the custody 
analysis, and determined that the test of whether a suspect feels 
“free to leave” during questioning was based only on 
“objective” factors.180 J.D.B. represents the first time that the 
Supreme Court has addressed this question directly,181 and it 
relied on both Simmons and Graham to overrule the state 
courts.182 
C. Looking Ahead 
Despite Gault’s failures of policy, the decision was the 
culmination of a movement that was a legal success.183 The 
holding that juveniles have a right to notice of charges against 
them, representation by counsel, and cross-examination of state 
witnesses triggered legislation that brought juvenile courts—for 
better or worse—much closer to the criminal court model. In 
turn, twenty-first century juvenile justice cases have prevailed, 
at least in part, as a result of Gault.  
In looking ahead, it is critical to identify the areas of juvenile 
and criminal justice reform that are primed for future institutional 
reform litigation in the wake of Simmons, Graham, and J.D.B. On 
the macro level, potential areas of focus include cases that affirm 
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the fundamental differences between adult and juvenile offenders, 
call for qualitatively different treatment for the two groups, ensure 
that “youth” is considered as mitigating and not aggravating, and 
perform a signaling function that the juvenile and criminal courts’ 
treatment of young offenders is both serious and important. 
On the micro level, recent precedent could support future 
litigation directed at each stage of the investigative and 
adjudicatory process. For instance, J.D.B. could lead to a 
cultural shift in the approach of police officers towards young 
suspects, in which age is taken into account during investigation, 
interrogation, and detention.184 At the trial stage, Simmons and 
Graham could support litigation that results in rigorous client—
centered representation for juveniles—whether in delinquency 
court, transfer hearings, or criminal court. Such reform could 
lead to elimination of the troubling practice of waiver of counsel 
by juveniles.185 At the dispositional or sentencing stage, litigation 
could mandate that prosecutors, judges, and probation officers 
take into account the youth’s brain development, mental and 
emotional state, making the process more uniformly appropriate 
for juvenile offenders.  
Simmons and Graham could also support future litigation that 
removes the option of “benign detention” and long-term 
warehousing of youth, thereby strengthening families through 
providing rehabilitative treatment within the community.186 These 
cases could be invoked to encourage system-wide recognition of 
the positive aspects of the rehabilitative ideal and the capacity of 
all young offenders to be redeemed. Further, these cases could 
be used to narrow the circumstances under which transfer from 
juvenile to criminal court is possible, as empirical data has 
shown that minors tried as adults receive little or no 
rehabilitation, are at greater risk of victimization in adult 
facilities, and experience severe collateral consequences of 
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criminal convictions.187 At the post-conviction stage, Graham has 
mandated that young offenders sentenced to lengthy terms of 
incarceration be offered a “meaningful opportunity” for release, 
requiring prisons that house juveniles to provide young offenders 
with the means to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation.188 
While it is unclear how this will translate into practice, as the 
“mechanisms for compliance” have been left to the states, future 
litigation could result in improved prison conditions for 
juveniles.189   
Thus, similar to the period post-Gault when reformers had 
high expectations that the legal victory would translate into long-
term policy change, there is optimism in the juvenile justice 
field that the litigation successes of Simmons, Graham, and 
J.D.B. will have a positive—if not transformative—effect upon 
the juvenile and criminal court systems.190 Challenges, however, 
are inevitable, illustrating once again that courts are constrained 
in their ability to reform complex institutions.   
V. LIMITATIONS & CHALLENGES 
Perhaps the most significant legacy of In re Gault was the 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that constitutional rights are 
not limited to adults. The decision led to an increasing number 
of constitutional challenges to federal and state laws and policies 
brought on behalf of youth, which in turn has enlarged the role 
of the federal courts in children’s lives.191 Yet, litigation 
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implicating the rights and liberties of children can raise difficult 
and highly charged questions about state authority over 
disenfranchised youth. It can force states to intervene between 
children and parents, challenge cultural norms regarding the role 
of the child in the family, and catalyze turf wars over already-
limited government funding.192 Although it is tempting to assume 
a “glass half full” approach to the question of whether Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina will 
lead to more meaningful policy reform than did Gault, it is 
essential to acknowledge what may be a harsh reality.   
A. Back Steps & Caveats 
Just as the successes of Kent v. United States, Gault, and In 
re Winship were followed by decisions that reversed course (or, 
as critics would say, that addressed the trio’s initial 
overcorrection),193 Simmons, Graham, and J.D.B. could generate 
a similar pattern. Future litigation relying on Simmons et al. will 
inevitably challenge less severe sentencing practices and less 
significant due process violations; as a result, the circumstances 
of future plaintiffs will not be as compelling as those faced by 
Christopher Simmons, Terrance Graham, or thirteen-year-old 
J.D.B. The criminal justice system could then shift back—at 
least temporarily—to a model that places more weight on the 
harm committed by a young offender than the developmental 
causes that mitigate culpability. 
In addition, as this Article is framed by a comparison of the 
effects of Gault with those of Simmons and its progeny, several 
caveats are in order. First, there are basic differences between 
Gault and the recent cases. As discussed, Gault paved the way 
for delinquency court to shift from a rehabilitative model to a 
retributive one that provides juveniles with many of the same 
due process protections that adults receive in criminal court. The 
litigation was a product, at least in part, of the new children’s 
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rights movement of the 1960s.194 Although the Court in Gault 
explicated the rights that should be afforded to juveniles charged 
with crimes, it left open many questions, including whether the 
due process rights to counsel and confrontation apply to other 
adjudicatory stages of the proceeding, such as detention and 
dispositional hearings.195 Gault did not define the specific role 
and purpose of counsel for children in juvenile court, leaving 
unsettled whether lawyers should represent the “expressed 
interests” of their young clients or advocate for their “best 
interests.”196 The decision did not address the matter of whether, 
and under what circumstances, a juvenile may waive the right to 
counsel.197 It also left the role of parents ambiguous.198 In 
addition, Gault declined to find a right to a transcript, to appeal, 
or to post-dispositional representation for juveniles.199  
In contrast, neither Simmons nor its progeny resulted from 
broad coalitions or movements determined to change the 
institution of the juvenile court or the fundamental ways in 
which the criminal and juvenile justice systems treat young 
offenders. The lawyers and human rights activists supporting the 
Simmons litigation were motivated as much or more by a 
determination to end capital punishment as by a desire for 
juvenile justice reform.200 Similarly, the Graham decision was 
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viewed by many advocates as the first step in a broader 
campaign to challenge all lengthy terms of incarceration.201 
Likewise, J.D.B.’s appeal was initiated by local attorneys who 
were incensed by the opinions in the courts of North Carolina, 
not by organized children’s rights groups.202 Further, Simmons 
and Graham each addressed relatively narrow (although 
critically important) questions regarding sentencing practices, 
and J.D.B. focused on a specific issue related to the provision of 
Miranda warnings. While these recent cases also left open 
questions, their holdings do not go to the heart of either the 
juvenile or criminal justice system, making it particularly 
difficult to predict whether they will facilitate broad reform.   
B. Will History Repeat Itself? 
In the wake of the legal successes of Simmons, Graham, and 
J.D.B., lower federal courts, state courts, and legislatures have 
issued holdings and passed laws that provide a glimpse of the 
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ways in which these Supreme Court decisions could translate 
into long-term sustainable policy. For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied on Simmons to hold that a seventeen-
year-old student’s murder confession was involuntary, based 
upon the inadequacy of the Miranda warnings given and the 
coercive nature of the police interrogation.203 A federal district 
court found under Graham that mandatory twenty-five year 
consecutive terms for a juvenile convicted of non-homicides 
violated the Eighth Amendment, for the 307-year sentence 
offered “no possibility of release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”204 A state appellate court found that 
Graham’s reasoning prohibited a long term-of-years sentence for 
a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide.205 Likewise, the 
prosecution of teenagers in adult criminal courts has been widely 
impacted by Simmons and Graham, as fifteen states have 
changed their laws since 2005, with at least nine others actively 
engaged in policy reform efforts.206 Specifically, the data shows 
that three states have expanded juvenile court jurisdiction so that 
youth who previously would have been automatically tried as 
                                                          
203 Doody v. Ryan, No. 06-17161, 2011 WL 1663551, at *33 (9th Cir. 
May 4, 2011).  
204 United States v. Mathurin, No. 09-21075-Cr., 2011 WL 2580775, at 
*3 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2011). 
205 People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2010); see also 
Duncan v. Alabama, 925 So. 2d 245, 250–52 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) 
(holding that the decision in Simmons was to be applied retroactively to cases 
on collateral review); People v. Nunez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 618 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (holding that juvenile sentences that exceed the potential lifetime 
of a defendant qualify as unconstitutional under the Graham ruling), 
superseded by grant of review, 255 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2011); In re Nunez, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 256–57 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a state sentence of 
JLWOP for this particular kidnapping violated constitutional protections as 
previously examined in Simmons). 
206 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE 
VICTORIES FROM 2005–2010, REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2010), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice. 
org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf; see also Mosi Secret, States 
Prosecute Fewer Teenagers in Adult Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at 
A1 (reporting that most of the studies concluding that older adolescents 
benefited more from treatment in the juvenile system than incarceration in the 
adult system relied on the reasoning of Simmons). 
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adults are now prosecuted in juvenile court.207 Ten states have 
revised their transfer laws, making it more likely that young 
offenders will remain in the juvenile system instead of being 
waived into criminal court.208 Four states have limited the 
applicability of their mandatory minimum sentencing laws by 
relying on the developmental differences between juveniles and 
adults.209 In addition, four states have passed laws that reduce the 
numbers of youth who can be housed in adult jails and 
prisons.210 Advances have also been made in the approach to the 
dispositional treatment of juvenile offenders, with one state’s 
very successful system of small, therapeutic rehabilitation 
centers being replicated throughout the United States.211 In fact, 
detention policy reform has gained traction despite budgetary 
constraints, as lawmakers, corrections officials, and agency 
administrators have acknowledged that redirecting funds for 
juvenile jails to community-based youth programs both lowers 
recidivism rates and saves money.212   
                                                          
207 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 7 (listing 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi); see also NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER 
CTR., 2006 STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE LEGISLATION 207–08, 243, 294 (2007), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/2006%20State%20JJ%20Legislation 
.pdf. 
208 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 7, 38 (listing 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington); see also NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra 
note 207, at 162–71. 
209 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 7 (listing 
Colorado, Georgia, Texas, and Washington); see also NAT’L JUVENILE 
DEFENDER CTR., supra note 207, at 162–63, 165, 170. 
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211 YOUTH TRANSITION FUNDERS GRP., A BLUEPRINT FOR JUVENILE 
JUSTICE REFORM 4–5, 9 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://www.ytfg.org/ 
documents/JEHT_SecondEdition.pdf; see also Christine Vestal, States Adopt 
Missouri Youth Justice Model, STATELINE (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www. 
stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=288904. 
212 See, e.g., Editorial, Texas’s Progress on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2011, at SR11 (reporting that Texas has moved “away from 
the prison model” for juveniles and toward a “less costly and more effective 
system” of community-based rehabilitative services); Md. Youth Jail to Be 
Scaled Back, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (May 16, 2011), http://www.correctional 
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Other recent state laws and court decisions reveal the 
limitations of the impact of Simmons and its progeny. For instance, 
one state court relied on Graham to hold that “sentencing a 
juvenile to life without parole (LWOP) for a murder he helped 
commit at age fourteen is not categorically unconstitutional.”213 
Similarly, another court held that Graham does not apply to 
juveniles who receive lengthy term-of-years sentences that result in 
the functional equivalent of LWOP.214 Ten other state courts have 
decided not to apply Graham to cases involving killings by 
juveniles, and seven have opted not to apply it when juveniles were 
accomplices to murder.215 In post-Graham attempted-murder cases, 
although one state court ordered resentencing for a juvenile serving 
LWOP because his conduct did not “result in death,” another 
upheld the sentence.216 Litigation efforts to extend Graham to 
sentences of life in prison with the possibility of parole have 
generally been unsuccessful.217 Further, some lawmakers have been 
unable to agree on new sentencing guidelines consistent with 
Graham for juveniles convicted of non-homicide felonies.218 As a 
result, legislative impasses have gone unresolved from one session 
of a state’s general assembly to the next.219  
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28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/nation/la-na-conservative-
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213 State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Wis. 2011); Todd 
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WISLAWJOURNAL.COM (May 20, 2011, 8:55 AM), http://wislawjournal. 
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214 People v. Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), 
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215 Hechinger, supra note 9, at 424 & nn.87–88. 
216 Id. at 118 & nn.87–88. 
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for Session, IOWA INDEP., Apr. 26, 2011, http://iowaindependent. 
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It is useful to apply Rosenberg’s framework to Simmons, 
Graham and J.D.B., and it allows for comparison with this 
Article’s earlier analysis of Gault.220 In regard to whether 
incentives exist for the court system to change its approach 
toward juveniles and young offenders, the answer is a qualified 
“yes.” Empirical evidence has shown that the macro-level 
reforms identified above could result in lower recidivism rates, 
improved public health, and substantial financial savings for 
state and local governments.221 As discussed earlier, data shows 
that involvement in court proceedings leads to a higher school 
drop-out rate, heightened risk of continued criminality, and 
chronic under- and unemployment.222 With Simmons as 
precedent, future litigation affirming that “youth” must be 
considered as mitigating and not aggravating could lead to fewer 
children being channeled into the court system, resulting in a 
larger population of educated, skilled workers.223 Similarly, 
litigation grounded in the holding of Graham calling for 
meaningful opportunities for release could lead to an 
improvement in the quality of mental health and substance abuse 
treatment for children and adolescents who are incarcerated. 
This could help prevent such conditions from becoming chronic 
                                                          
Addressing Juvenile Offenders Would Be “Unconscionable,” IOWA 
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 28, 2011, http://iowaindependent.com/55394/iowa-rep-
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221 See Birckhead, supra note 187, at 1460–62 & nn.78–83; Birckhead, 
supra note 135, at 1480–81 & nn.134–37; Mark Soler, Dana Shoenberg & 
Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 490–496 (2009). 
222 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. “Studies show that a 
child who has been suspended is more likely to be retained in his or her 
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adult.” CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: 
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 3 (2010). “Toward the backend of the 
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and reduce delinquency and recidivism rates among at-risk 
populations.224 In addition, government budgets would see 
windfalls if fewer young offenders were incarcerated for long 
terms of years. In contrast, if the court system fails to augment 
resources and improve rehabilitation programs and commitment 
facilities for juveniles, it will lose credibility and public 
confidence, and state and local economies will continue to incur 
significant financial costs. Just as states implemented civil rights 
legislation post-Brown only after their funding was threatened,225 
economics is likely to be the most salient incentive in the current 
climate.   
Unlike the post-Gault period, during which there was 
intractable judicial resistance and few organizations committed to 
juvenile court reform,226 today there are multiple constituencies 
and parallel organizations that can work in tandem with the 
courts to effect change. They include state legislatures;227 
advocacy organizations (non-profit, private, governmental);228 
legal academics;229 the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and 
                                                          
224 See Laurie Chassin, Juvenile Justice and Substance Abuse, 18  
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Delinquency Prevention;230 and professional organizations such 
as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry.231 
Likewise, litigation that draws an analogy between juvenile court 
and mental health commitments to invoke the “right to 
treatment” doctrine could result in settlement agreements or 
court orders directing state lawmakers to expend funds on 
indigent defense services, residential mental health and drug 
treatment for adolescents, and so forth.232 In short, while there 
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PROVIDENCE J. (Apr, 22, 2011), http://www.projo.com/news/content/ 
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(reporting that the ACLU has filed a class-action lawsuit and taken steps to 
urge federal OJJDP officials to investigate the unlawful detention of truant 
juveniles in the state’s training school); Programs & Campaigns, CHILD. 
DEF. FUND, http://www.childrensdefense.org/programs-campaigns/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
232 See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358–59 (7th Cir. 1974) 
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are clear limitations to the degree of change that Simmons and 
its progeny are likely to generate, the possibilities are endless—
although they are admittedly only possibilities.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
With states facing staggering budgetary shortfalls and 
lawmakers increasingly willing to make deep cuts to the criminal 
justice system,233 it is tempting to overstate the significance of 
successful Supreme Court litigation, rather than focus on such 
intractable matters as the elimination of treatment programs for 
young offenders.234 Yet, while legal victories from In re Gault to 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina are worthy of being labeled 
“landmark,” it is critical to remember that rarely do “rights 
triumph over politics.”235 Sustainable policy reform often requires 
departing from the status quo, creating new models rather than 
merely dismantling old ones, and making short-term investments 
in order to reap long-term benefits—none of which is easy or 
popular during hard economic and culturally divisive times. 
One promising example may be found in the Civil Citation 
Initiative in Miami, Florida, a program in which children who 
commit minor misdemeanors are referred to targeted intervention 
services rather than arrested and exposed to the juvenile justice 
system.236 The initiative—developed by a coalition of community 
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Rights, FOX CHARLOTTE (May 13, 2011), http://www.foxcharlotte.com/news 
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activists, police officers, lawyers, and teachers—has significantly 
lowered recidivism rates, and the Miami-Dade community has 
seen a thirty percent drop in juvenile arrests.237 As a result, the 
program has led to increased public safety and taxpayer savings 
and has been identified as a national model.238 With this lesson in 
mind, proponents of significant social reform must continue to 
focus their attention on legislatures and, perhaps most 
importantly, on political action.239 As Gerald Rosenberg has 
stated, “[p]olitical organizing, political mobilization, and voter 
registration may not be glamorous . . . but they are the best if not 
the only hope to produce change—not as a fallback position, not 
as a complement to a legal strategy, but as the strategy itself.”240 
In this way, with litigators working in tandem with both 
lawmakers and activists, the hope for juvenile justice reform in 
the twenty-first century will not be hollow. 
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